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 The positive effect of globalization has continued to impact FDI inflow to developing countries 
during the last decade except for the rising influence of political risk in host locations. Mixed 
outcomes have trailed the findings related to the studies on FDI and political risk relationship 
and in particular on African countries like Nigeria. This paper investigated the effect of political 
risk on FDI inflow to Nigeria using secondary data from 2000 to 2014 using simple linear 
regression. The study combined from select variables, the institutional factors with location 
determinants peculiar to Nigeria’s risk environment.  It is found that political risk holds a 
positive and significant association with FDI to Nigeria but not close enough to inhibit the 
inflow of foreign investment to the country. However, the findings provide a strong basis for 
policy shift in relation to security, country promotion and rebranding as well strengthening of 
institutions.  
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The recent development in the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to developing countries 
is a major sign of globalization mainly driven by the efforts made in liberalizing many economies 
creating a near absence of trade barriers. This feat is commonly associated with investors’ concern on 
what may befall such investments in the target locations. The world FDI performances in the last decade 
has been encouraging which shows how vital its role in global economic contribution is, for example 
although a decline was witnessed in 2014 FDI flow compared to 2013, it accounted for 40% of the 
world total external development finance targeting developed and transition economies according to 
the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2015), making it a primary source of capital. The 16% decline 
according to this report shows $1.47trn in 2013 as against $1.2trn in 2014. The overall regional 
attractions of global FDI for the same period shows that developing Asia maintained a leading role as 
preferred destination with nearly half trillion in value ($465bn), followed by Europe ($289bn), Latin 
America and the Caribbean ($159bn), North America ($146bn), Africa ($54bn) and the transition 
economies had $48bn. (UNCTAD, 2015). 
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It can be deduced from the above figures quoted from the WIR that Africa receives less than 5% of the 
world total despite the rising rate of return on FDI in the continent since 2000 (Adams, 2009), intense 
promotional efforts to attract (UNCTAD, 1995) and the rising economic and emerging market 
potentials (UNCTAD, 2015). Additionally, this report showed that West Africa has its share of FDI 
fall by 10% in the same period due largely to falling prices in commodity markets, Ebola disease 
outbreak and regional conflicts. Nigeria’s share which form part of the top five host economies in the 
continent stand at $4.7bn being 2.5% Africa’s total. This report shows a 16% fall from the preceding 
year arising from the country’s effort towards diversification into non-oil sectors (UNCTAD, 2015) 
which has remain in the foremost of recommendations by scholars (Kareem et al., 2012). 
This marked decline in the world FDI performances as revealed by this report (UNCTAD, 2015) is a 
result of a fragile global economy, divestments in new investment, policy uncertainty and the rising 
geopolitical risks. Country risks are found to discourage FDI (Hayakawa et al., 2011) and are 
considered a major source of concern whenever planning for wider success whether to a local or foreign 
firm. Country risks according to the PRS Group are either economic, financial or political which are 
further categorized into six classes of economic, transfer, exchange, location, sovereign and political 
risks (Meldrum, 2000) commonly used by most rating services.  
Literature in greater details addresses the influence of political risk on FDI inflow in developing 
nations. Similarly multinational firms have developed greater interest in the type and character of 
political risks that are likely to shape their decisions when in a host nation. This is because undeveloped 
and or modernizing economies have in their character political risks that create some degree of business 
uncertainty within the transnational political environment especially for foreign investors (Al Khattab 
et al., 2008) thereby making firms undertake risk assessment. We examine the character of political 
risk in Nigeria and its likely influence on foreign direct investment inflow using a secondary data from 
2000 to 2014. This paper contributed to literature by assessing one of the leading emerging economies 
in sub Saharan Africa, together informing on the true investment environment in the context of political 
risk associated perception to the country. Literature has long been silent on Africa’s political risk and 
in particular Nigeria instead emphasizing the negative perceptions to potential investors. The paper 
proceeds with the theoretical review, methodology, results and then concludes. 
2. Theoretical background and Hypotheses 
Recent growing interest in the subject of political risk and its relationship to FDI provides a good basis 
seeking to evaluate its impacts and or relationships (Sottilotta, 2013) because few works offer greater 
significance to its effect on inward FDI flow (Goswami & Haider, 2014) particularly on Africa.  The 
major advantage derived by MNEs with respect to investing in different locations is the match obtained 
from the strategies and objectives in operations (Bartels et al., 2008), but the location benefits in 
themselves continue to remain relevant from the perspective of host locations (Narula, 2006). These 
host locations from many developing countries are greatly perceived as risky, most especially countries 
from the sub Saharan Africa (SSA) thereby according them less special attention in their efforts to 
attract FDI (Bartels et al., 2008). The risk associated with foreign investment come from the two classes 
in the form of macro or micro (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). The macro aspects of risk are seen to emanate 
from the sudden changes in political system affecting capital and investment through all-out war, 
expropriation or civil unrest; while the micro part relates to the bureaucratic or administrative 
overloads, corruption and the inefficiencies found in the judiciary. The perspective given in the work 
of Benáček et al. (2014) captured the basis for which MNEs reaction to host location characteristics 
take place. The study found that FDI going to receiving countries that are adjudge poor with weak and 
diverse institutions are found to be sensitive to political risk factors when compared to the one going 
to developed countries because of their long standing economies with similar institutional structure. 
There are different categorizations of political risk which literature have documented and continue to 
elicit debate. These studies seeking to classify political risk were able to maintain a connecting line in 
their quest to draw such basic distinctions without breaking from each other’s line of conception. These 
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studies include among others (Al Khattab et al., 2008; Jensen, 2008; Moosa, 2002; Schmidt, 1986). 
The major outstanding issue that has continued to remain unresolved in the assessment of the FDI-
political risk relationship is the nature and character of investor preferences of countries that exhibit 
high market potentials but are marred by greater political risk on investment projects (Agarwal & 
Ramaswami, 1992) or integrating the basic determinants of FDI with the political risk elements in order 
to find their effects (Busse & Hefeker, 2005). The need to close this gap becomes evidently imperative 
in the current challenges to foreign capital flow and allocation to developing countries. However, 
studies in the past favored that high risk in developing countries serving as host countries is not 
considered as a hindrance to FDI inflows (van Wyk & Lal, 2008). Other studies proving the lesser 
effect of political risk in inhibiting flow of FDI show that total FDI inflow is higher in risky countries 
when serving as a measure of country risk level of debt (Albuquerque, 2003), while long term strategic 
benefits are found to drive FDI into China despite high political risk (Pan, 2003). 
The risk environment in Nigeria offers a unique features compared to any other African country, 
because the country displays the combined basic location characteristics such as large market (Cleeve, 
2008), abundant natural resources (Asiedu, 2006; Dinda, 2014) and strong economic growth potentials 
(Ayanwale, 2007) that continue to drive international investment. Despite these favorable location 
benefits, Nigeria’s investment climate account for greater exposure to large scale uncertainties that are 
in themselves major disincentives to FDI. The few research works that addressed political risk against 
FDI in relations to Nigeria includes (Bischoff & Lambrechts, 2010; Frynas & Mellahi, 2003) 
specifically resting their analyses on the regional assessment of the Niger-Delta risks in relation to 
multinational oil and gas businesses. Similarly most of the existing literature works available 
concentrates attention on the oil and gas associated risks, the overall political risks covering the wider 
business environment has only  been addressed along other determinants of FDI as the case studied by 
Okpara et al. (2012) who found that political risk is negative and insignificant on FDI inflow to Nigeria.  
We developed a framework that seek to assemble the political risk indicators peculiar to the case at 
hand following studies on similar subjects on Nigeria by grouping them first, comparing the variables 
related to risk indices and creating and bringing up a simple political risk index that can help to address 
and estimate the proposed model. In arriving at the select variables found fit for the present study, we 
considered the work of Wafure and Abu (2010) on their perspective on Niger-Delta crisis as one 
affecting oil production,  Nwogwugwu et al. (2012) who identified common risks in Niger-Delta to 
include pipeline vandalism, kidnapping, illegal bunkering of oil and militant uprising and the work of 
Ugwuanyi and Odigbo (2012) who identified serial internal conflicts in the form of ethnic, religious 
and tribal inclination as another dimension of instability to the country. 
The rising interest in Boko Haram uprising document a new line of risk to Nigeria involving bombings 
of religious sites, markets, schools, kidnapping, cattle rustling and armed robbery which we view as a 
another form of religious violence studied in greater literature as (Akinde & Yusuff, 2014; Blanquart, 
2012; Casimir, Nwaoga, & Ogbozor, 2014; Eme & Ibietan, 2012; Nicklas & Mandela, 2014; Okoli & 
Agada, 2014). The activities of the Islamic insurgents give rise to further external threats to Nigeria’s 
land borders on the northern axis. The concern of MNCs on the level and scale of external conflict to 
the country host of their investment has been acknowledged by literature (Busse & hefecker, 2005). 
Poverty and income gap were also found to contribute to crime in Nigeria (Inyang & Abraham, 2013) 
and as well Corruption was seen to be a major obstacle for doing business in the country (NBS, 2010; 
The PRS Group, 2013) and past studies showed its unrelenting negative effect on FDI (Esew & 
Yaroson, 2014; Mark & Nwaiwu, 2015; Udoh & Egwaikhide, 2008). Some studies addressed the 
components of risk in the oil and gas business although wider risks covering other sectors were 
mentioned (Bischoff & Lambrechts, 2010; Somers-cox, 2014). There are other significant indices of 
importance considered of primary relevance to our model, the changes in government policy and the 
investment profile of the country being assessed as developed in the ICRG institutional measures. 
Literature support that MNEs remain cautious of the changes in policy of government (Cherian & 
Perotti, 2001) and as well the timing of such changes (Cheng & Kwan, 2000) being crucial to FDI 
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attraction and or decisions. The role related to profiling investment opportunities in helping FDI flow 
in both developing and industrializing nations has been emphasized (Baek & Qian, 2011) and also in 
explaining the differences in industry and international investment profile of nations relating to issues 
in location decisions (Dunning, 2001) as a matter of importance found in the eclectic paradigm. We 
therefore choose investment profile, changes in government policy, disputes with neighboring countries 
and corruption; ethnic tension, religious tension, political violence and kidnapping as common and 
most influential risk indices present in the Nigeria’s political risk environment assembled among the 
diverse literature noted above. The factors reflect institutional, social and cultural considerations.  
2.1 Investment Profile 
Studies in the past have used the ICRG classification of investment profile of host nations to examine 
the level and extent of how payments, repatriation of profits and expropriation or viability of contracts 
are affected (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013; Jakobsen & & Soysa, 2006; Mohamed & Sidiropoulos, 
2010). We hypothesized that investment profile of host nation is expected to favor the inflow of FDI 
despite the discouraging effect of political risk (H1). 
2.2 Changes in government policy 
Unstable policy changes in a business environment constitute greater political risk to foreign 
investment. The study conducted by Fedderke and Romm (2006) has been concerned with the impact 
of policy involvement in helping to drive FDI inflow to South Africa along other determinants found 
that policies rolled out by government are strong and direct enough to address their essence showing 
that government policy measures as good as they are continue to improve FDI flow to the country. We 
hypothesized that consistent policy will promote investment but changes and uncertainty in policy is 
expected to affect FDI inflows significantly (H2). 
2.3 Disputes with neighboring countries 
 
Research findings favors the concern of MNCs on the level and scale of internal and external conflicts 
to the country host of their investment by raising the economic and political instability either in form 
of civil wars, political violence, sanctions or full scale war (Busse & Hefeker, 2005). It is valid to relate 
FDI flows to the potential effects of border conflicts by hypothesizing that host nation disputes with its 
neighbors can affect its FDI potentials (H3).  
2.4 Corruption   
 
Corruption is found to affect investment in countries where it is rampant (Everhart, 2010); creates 
public and or private additional non market business costs (Kurtzman et al., 2004) and may create an 
unattractive climate for investment depending on the type of FDI in question (Brouthers et al., 2008).  
Most research favored its negative effect on Nigeria and how it affects investment flow by limiting the 
potentials of the nation and damaging its image worldwide (Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Freeman, 2009; 
Esew & Yaroson, 2014; Mark & Nwaiwu, 2015; Udoh & Egwaikhide, 2008). Corruption being 
component of institutional factors is predicted to significantly affect FDI inflow (H4). 
2.5 Ethnic tension 
Ethnicity has conflict generating effect and is found to assist in determining political and economic 
structure of nations and societies (Alesina et al., 2002) thereby serving as a form of proxy for pressure 
group divisions, aimed at promoting rent-seeking and overspending, undermining public goods 
provision and encouraging inequality (Posner, 2004). Literature acknowledges the influence of 
ethnicity (and the conflicts it breeds) on growth movement of African societies when it identified that 
increased diversity inhibits growth especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Part of 
the explanations as to the slow growth tragedy of Africa is the issue of domestic destiny embedded 
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with ethno-linguistic diversity as one of the factors affecting investment flow (Collier & Gunning, 
1999).  It is predicted therefore that ethnicity and its associated features may significantly affect FDI 
inflow (H5). 
2.6 Religious tension 
 
Literature favors the principles that religion in its moderate and anti-violent forms are major origins of 
social order (Etzioni, 2008) and that extreme forms of beliefs begets terrorism being another form of 
political violence which is seen to affect capital flow in form of FDI (Filer & Stanisic, 2012). The need 
to inquire further on the link between religion and violence has been suggested by scholars (Casimir et 
al., 2014) leading to an emerging area being referred to as ‘religious violence’. Religion and its 
associated effect are expected to have significant effect on FDI inflow (H6). 
2.7 Political violence 
Studies shows that political violence has been found to affect FDI by decreasing the chances of the 
country chosen as an investment location rather than reducing the size of investment (Li, 2006) and 
findings further shows that such political violence are associated with being the product of weak 
institutions (Besley & Persson, 2011). Political violence can largely affect the return on investment of 
multinational firms (Jensen, 2008) even though it was considered not significant enough to hinder the 
attraction of FDI (Edwards, 1990). Deep ethnic, tribal and religious misunderstanding and or 
intolerance related conflicts are common forms of violence in Nigeria (Ugwuanyi & Odigbo, 2012). 
We therefore predict that political violence may have significant effect on FDI inflow (H7). 
2.8 Kidnapping  
 
Kidnapping is primarily considered as an unplanned effect of globalization (Yun, 2007) because it is 
considered a major component of violent crime that is seen to affect investment across borders. Recent 
study by (Laverde et al., 2009) investigated the relationship between crime, uncertainty and stock return 
in Columbia and found that violent crimes including kidnapping affect stock market negatively. 
Kidnapping is  becoming a booming business in Nigeria especially kidnapping for ransom rising to an 
unprecedented level of over 2000 cases recorded between 2009 to 2012 alone (Okoli & Agada, 2014).  
The Boko Haram insurgency produced the habit of abducting foreign workers, mid-level government 
officials and priests (both Muslim and Christians) since 2010 (Jamestown Foundation, 2014). The 
Niger Delta has been the hot bed for kidnapping oil workers by militants leading to elevating 
kidnapping as a common crime in the region. We expect kidnapping to affect FDI inflow greatly (H8). 
3. Method 
The data reflecting the dependent variable (FDI) shows a time series pattern for the inflow to Nigeria 
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) covering the 
period 2000-2014.  The UNCTAD figures are used for their consistency and accuracy in presenting 
country inflow overtime. While the data for the independent variables featuring the political risk 
indicators were obtained from sources peculiar to the index as it covers the country being assessed. The 
risk indicators as earlier mentioned are change in government policy (CGP), Kidnapping (Kid), 
Investment Profile (InvtP), Ethnic Tension (EthT), Religious Tension (RelT), Political Violence 
(PolV), Corruption (CORR), and Dispute with Neighboring Countries (DNC). KID data are carefully 
obtained from Nigeria Police, Red24 and the Global Data of events after screening and harmonized to 
arrive at one near comprehensive and reliable. PolV data is from the ITERATE covering 1995-2012 
and 2013-2016, and that of the Armed Conflicts (1946-2014) provided by the Uppsala conflict data 
program (UCDP) compared and used. These were used in the past to assess PolV (Li, 2006; Powers & 
Choi, 2012). The variable DNC is proxied by external conflict involving conflicts across Nigerian 
borders on both the northern and southern borders. The datasets for DNC, InvtP, EthT, RelT and CORR 
are obtained from the ICRG for its wider acclaim in its traditional form of country wide standing. 
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Our study differs with the past studies in that the use of entire political risk indicators in assessing 
country political risk, wherein here we used selected and peculiar indices to the target environment. 
We find for example the use of military in politics and democratic accountability to be in conflict with 
one another and cannot be assembled in one model, particularly in the angle of time period for the 
study, location and condition for which the assessment takes place. Our model follow the pattern of 
previous studies in assessing risk impact of location towards repelling FDI except in taking account of 
the political risk indices with strong peculiar nature to the study area. We specify the following model 
for estimation; 
FDIt = β0 + β1 CGPt + β2 KIDt + β3 InvtPt + β4 DNCt + β5 RelTt + β6 EthTt + β7 PolVt + β8 CORRt + Ԑt    
where; FDI= foreign direct investment; CGP= changes in government policy; KID= kidnapping; InvtP= 
investment profile; DNC= disputes with neighboring countries; RelT= religious tension; EthT= ethnic tension; 
PolV= political violence CORR= corruption; Β= beta is constant; t= time, and Ԑ= error term. 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the correlation analysis between political risk indices and FDI. The findings from the 
results establish positive association between FDI, KID, and PolV at significant levels being 
components of high crimes in Nigerian society. For the institutional variables, a negative association 
between FDI and DNC at significant level is observed. InvtP, EthT, RelT and CORR are positive and 
significant. Although, the level of association between all the institutional variables is observed to be 
higher, this could be connected to the degree of weak institutions generally found in developing 
countries as most studies found (Busse & Hefeker, 2005; Esew & Yaroson, 2014; Jensen, 2008).  
Table 1  
Correlation Matrix 
         FDI KID InvtP    DNC    RelT         EthT   PolV CORR 
FDI 1        
KID 0.246 1       
InvtP 0.8244 0.4733 1      
DNC -0.8734 -0.4156 -0.82 1     
RelT 0.4701 0.0585 0.2386 -0.6247 1  
EthT 0.6484 0.3089 0.6431 -0.8638 0.7857 1   
PolV 0.1148 0.8485 0.4159 -0.314 -0.0561 0.1838 1  
CORR 0.9104 0.4465 0.9065 -0.8836 0.542 0.7213 0.3286 1
 
While conducting the preliminary tests, InvtP has been observed to exhibit the features of being 
collinear leading to it being dropped as recommended by Kennedy (2008). To proceed therefore with 
the estimation, centering was conducted at this stage following the studies of others (Disatnik & Sivan, 
2014; Smith & Sasaki, 1979). Further to this is the removal of CGP as a component of the estimation 
due to the assumption that policy changes were adjudge stable throughout the period of the study and 
the direction of a past study point to the fact that government policies have greater effects but are 
sometimes found not to have any impact as source of political risk (Globerman & Shapiro, 1999). 
4.1 Regression Results 
Table 2 highlights the model as regressed in testing the hypotheses. 
4.1.1 KID has positive and significant effect on FDI indicating its ability to influence its outcome to 
Nigeria at 10% level. Although studies in the past found that kidnapping does not affect investment 
flow (Barros, 2003; Pshisva & Suarez, 2006), the effect observed here also point to less influence 
on FDI indicating that we cannot reject the hypothesis (H8) due to rising crime in that direction. 
4.1.2 The effect of RelT is positive at 1% significant level indicating that our finding is consistent 
with the previous work of (Busse & Hefecker, 2005) thereby lending support to (Dolansky & Alon, 
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2008) especially when viewed in the context of wider diversity of the country and the size of the 
country’s economy. The result from the analysis provides the acceptance of the hypothesis (H6) 
although positive; it is weak to support the assumption since a small fraction can be attracted as past 
studies show. 
4.1.3 The rising effect of cross border conflicts represented by DNC appear negative and significant 
at 1% level close enough to affect inflow of FDI to Nigeria, supporting our assumption. This finding 
lend support to the work of (Busse & Hefeker, 2005). This shows that there is a relationship between 
cross border conflicts witness on both the northern borders by the dreaded Boko Haram group and 
on the South by the Niger Delta militants on the seas of the gulf of Guinea or the Cameroons and 
FDI inflow lending support to our hypothesis (H3).  
4.1.4 A significant and negative effect from EthT is found on FDI inflow also at 1% level signifying 
ethnicity in Nigeria has the potency of reducing the inflow of FDI thereby supporting our hypothesis 
and lending further support to the findings of past studies (Collier & Gunning, 1999). 
4.1.5 PolV is negative and significant on FDI at 1% level indicating that not all forms of political 
violence affect the size or flow of FDI lending support to earlier works (Edwards, 1990; Li, 2006) 
indicating that our assumption here cannot stand for (H7). 
4.1.6 CORR is found to positively and significantly affect FDI although at an almost no effect on 
investment flow (also at 1%) which finding is consistent with similar outcomes (Everhart, 2010; 
Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), giving support to our earlier claim for (H4) although in a small fraction 
of impact.    
Table 2  
Results of Estimation for FDI and Political Risk Indicators 
Var (1) (2) (3) 
 Model 1 Serial correction Robust 
KID 0.000183* -1.0000053 0.000183*
 (0.000109) (7.95e-05) (0.000118)
DNC -0.631*** -0.512*** -0.631***
 (0.118) (0.114) (0.117)
RelT 0.260*** -0.153 0.260***
 (0.0841) (0.152) (0.0873)
EthT -1.093*** -0.452** -1.093***
 (0.212) (0.179) (0.149)
PolV -0.00262*** -0.00216*** -0.00262***
 (0.000714) (0.000556) (0.000571)
CORR 2.043*** 1.734*** 2.043***
 (0.195) (0.252) (0.250)
Constant 13.51*** 12.39*** 13.51***
 (1.601) (1.483) (1.555)
Observations 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.951 0.727 0.951 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The relevant cases presented above shows the dominating but balanced effect of political risk on FDI 
inflow to Nigeria in contrast to the work of  (Okpara et al., 2012) who found that political risk has 
negative and insignificant influence on FDI to Nigeria. 
5. Conclusion  
The position above aimed to explain the nature of FDI-political risk relationship reflects very much on 
the influence of institutional factors such as corruption, ethnicity and religion and as well location 
variables of risk associated impact like kidnapping, political violence and cross border conflicts capable 
of instigating disputes with neighboring nations as those combining to wield an approximate influence 
in determining foreign investment inflow to Nigeria. On average, Political risk is found to have a 
positive and significant influence on FDI inflow to Nigeria giving support to early theories on location 
decision and empirical literature. However, this rising effect is not too close to inhibit foreign 
investment inflow because the country parades the best attractive location factors in terms of market 
size (Ajayi, 2006; Obadan, 1982; Wafure & Abu, 2010) and natural resource abundance (Asiedu, 2006; 
Dinda, 2014) and as well economic growth potentials (Ayanwale, 2007) being of primary 
considerations in MNEs location decisions. Further to this is the compensation benefits associated with 
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higher risk locations in terms of investment returns (Overseas Development Institution, 1997). We 
cannot relate the influence of location factors as primary determinants of FDI in helping to mitigate the 
effect of political risk on FDI inflows such as market size, natural endowments or labour availability; 
future studies should set out a new agenda in attending to these issues. The sample used is considered 
small and therefore when expanded may change the outcome that may lead to new information. 
Relevant policy implication of these findings revolved round the need for government to strengthen its 
security and intelligence agencies towards proactive measures aimed at curbing crimes, strengthening 
government institutions in fighting corruption, intolerance (religious and ethnic) and cross border 
conflicts. The risk perception on Nigeria requires the efforts of government and stakeholders in 
investment promotion and country rebranding to help in attracting and informing potential investors 
the true position of the country’s investment environment. 
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